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This contribution analyses the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon for the nexus between the 
EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and the protection of human rights. It is argued that 
the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty significantly affected the law and practice of the CCP in 
the sense that human rights considerations have become an integral part of the EU’s trade 
policy. This is reflected both at the procedural level, with the practice of human rights impact 
assessments as a clear example; at the judicial level, with the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
as a key point of reference for assessing the legality of the EU’s external action; and at the 
practical level, with the introduction of new initiatives and mechanisms aiming at the 








The use of trade instruments for the promotion of non-trade objectives, including respect for 
human rights, pre-dates the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.1 Typical examples concern 
the inclusion of so-called “essential element clauses” in bilateral trade agreements,2 the 
application of human rights conditionality within the context of the EU’s system of generalised 
preferences for developing countries (GSP+)3 and the establishment of human rights dialogues 
                                                     
1 It is noteworthy that the early case law of the ECJ already confirmed that non-economic objectives could fall 
within the scope of the CCP. See e.g. Opinion 1/78 Natural Rubber, EU:C:1979:224; Case C-45/86, Tariff 
Preferences, EU:C:1987:163, para. 19-20; Case C-70/94, Werner, EU:C:1995:328, para. 10; Case C-124/95, Centro 
Com, EU:C:1997:8. 
2 Communication from the Commission on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights 
in agreements between the Community and third countries, COM (95) 216 final, 23 May 1995. 
3 S. Velluti, ‘Human Rights Conditionality in the EU GSP Scheme: A Focus on Those in Need or a Need to Refocus?’, 
in N. Ferreira and D. Kostakopoulou (eds.), The Human Face of the European Union. Are EU Law and Policy 
Humane Enough? (CUP, 2016), p. 342-366. The EU’s GSP scheme is discussed in Chapter X in this Volume. 
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as part of the broader framework of bilateral relations with third countries.4 Whereas the EU’s 
common commercial policy (CCP) has thus never been “apolitical”, the Lisbon Treaty 
strengthened the link between trade and human rights in several aspects. 
First, the nexus between CCP and human rights is now firmly anchored in the EU’s primary 
law. Of particular significance is the provision in Article 207 TFEU that “[t]he common 
commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the 
Union’s external action”. The latter, enshrined in Articles 3 (5) and 21 TEU, explicitly refer to 
respect for and promotion of human rights. Even though the precise meaning of the partly 
overlapping provisions may be subject to discussion, it is obvious that the integration of 
human rights in EU external trade relations is a constitutional obligation and not a mere policy 
choice. 
Second, the Lisbon Treaty shifted the institutional balance in the CCP. In particular, the 
European Parliament acquired the power to give or withhold consent to trade agreements 
(Article 218 (6) (a) TFEU) whereas it only used to be consulted on trade deals in the past. 
Moreover, the Parliament is to be kept informed about the progress of trade negotiations 
(Article 207 (3) TFEU) and acts as a co-legislator with the Council under the ordinary legislative 
procedure for the adoption of measures defining the framework for implementing the CCP.5 
On several occasions, the European Parliament underlined its ambition to safeguard the 
strong connection between trade and human rights in the conduct of its activities.6 
Third, the integration of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in EU primary law 
strengthened the EU’s commitment to the protection of human rights. In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that the term “fundamental rights” is used within the specific context of the EU 
legal order whereas the term “human rights” derives from international law. However, there 
is a significant overlap in terms of substance as can be derived from a comparison between 
the content of the Charter and the core UN conventions on human rights.7 Moreover, as can 
be derived from Article 6 TEU, the protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order 
consists of different, partly overlapping, layers including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
                                                     
4 Guidelines on human rights dialogues with third countries: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage_en/6987/EU%20Human%20rights%20guidelines.  
5 On the role of the European Parliament in the CCP, see Chapter X in this Volume.  
6 See e.g. A7-0312/2010, Report on Human rights and social and environmental standards in international trade 
agreements. On the role of the European Parliament and its influence on the EU’s trade agenda, see also: 
F. Hoffmeister, ‘The European Union as an International Trade Negotiator’, in J. Koops and G. Macaj (eds.), The 
European Union as a Diplomatic Actor (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 144-146.  
7 On this terminological distinction, see: European Commission, ‘Guidelines on the analysis of human rights 
impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives’: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf, p. 3. 
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the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 
The aim of the contribution is to analyse the impact of the identified normative changes 
for the law and practice of the CCP in the post-Lisbon era. After an analysis of the evolution of 
the general policy framework, in particular as far as the introduction of human rights impact 
assessments is concerned, the relevant case law of the Court of Justice will be scrutinised. 
Particular attention will be devoted to the discussion surrounding the extraterritorial 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the legal obligations of the EU 
institutions in the framework of trade agreements with third countries. Finally, the challenges 
surrounding the effective enforcement of human rights clauses and social norms in EU Free 
Trade Agreements will be tackled.  
Accordingly, it will be argued that the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty significantly 
affected the CCP in the sense that human rights considerations have become an integral part 
of the EU’s trade policy. This is reflected both at the procedural level, with the practice of 
human rights impact assessments as a clear example; at the judicial level, with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights as a key point of reference for assessing the legality of the EU’s external 
action; and at the practical level, with the introduction of new initiatives and mechanisms 
aiming at the promotion of respect for human rights in the framework of the CCP.  
 
2. Policy Impact of the Lisbon Treaty: The Practice of Human Rights Impact Assessments 
 
The constitutionalisation of the trade-human rights nexus significantly affected the EU’s policy 
documents related to the implementation of the CCP. In 2010, the European Commission 
Communication Trade, Growth and World Affairs already emphasised the ambition to use 
trade policy as an instrument in order “to encourage our partners to promote the respect of 
human rights, labour standards, the environment and good governance”.8 The subsequent 
Joint Communication of the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, entitled Human Rights and democracy at the heart of EU external 
action – towards a more effective approach, confirmed the “mainstreaming” of human rights 
and democratisation as a horizontal objective permeating all the EU’s actions. This implies, 
amongst others, that “[t]he human rights situation in the partner country should be 
considered when the EU decides whether or not to launch or conclude FTA negotiations”.9 
                                                     
8 COM (2010) 612, p. 15.  
9 COM (2011) 886, p. 12. 
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The 2012 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy provided 
the first attempt to operationalise the EU’s commitment under Article  3 (5) TEU.10 
The envisaged measures inter alia concerned the development of a methodology “to aid 
consideration of the human rights situation in a third country in connection with the launch 
or conclusion of free trade and/or investment agreements”, the reinforcement of human 
rights dialogues with FTA partners, the inclusion of human rights considerations in the 
unfolding EU investment policy and a revision of the CFSP Common Position on arms export 
and the Regulation on trade in goods which can be used for capital punishment or torture. 
Subsequent policy documents reiterated and reinforced the values dimension of the EU’s 
trade policy. For instance, the 2015 Trade for all strategy explicitly defined the promotion of 
sustainable development, human rights and good governance as a key pillar of the CCP.11  
Whereas the Lisbon Treaty thus provided new impetus to the policy framework of the 
trade-human rights nexus, the implementation of this ambitious framework faced significant 
legal and political challenges. A good illustration concerns the discussion surrounding the 
failure of the European Commission to conduct a specific human rights impact assessment 
(HRIA) in anticipation of the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Vietnam. In the 
Commission’s view a separate HRIA concerning the FTA with Vietnam was unnecessary taking 
into account that the negotiations with Vietnam were taking place under the legal framework 
established for the ASEAN free trade negotiations. The latter had started before the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. It further argued that a standalone HRIA would be against the 
established integrated approach, implying that economic, social, environmental and – as of 
2011 – human rights impacts are considered side by side. Moreover, the Commission pointed 
at the existence of other human rights instruments such as human rights clauses in the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Vietnam, the enhanced human rights 
dialogue as well as public statements and foreign policy démarches.12 These arguments could 
not convince the European ombudsman, who concluded that the Commission’s refusal to 
carry out a HRIA constituted an example of maladministration. While acknowledging that 
“there appears to be no express and specific legally binding requirement to carry out a human 
rights impact assessment concerning the relevant free trade agreement”, she took the view 
                                                     
10 Council of the EU, Doc. 11855/12. 
11 European Commission, ‘Trade for all. Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy’, October 2015: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf.   
12 European Ombudsman, Decision in case 1409/2014/MHZ on the European Commission’s failure to carry out a 
prior human rights impact assessment of the EU-Vietnam free trade agreement: 
https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/64308, para. 5.  
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that such an obligation can be derived from the spirit of Article 21 (1) TEU and Article 21 (2) (b) 
TEU in conjunction with Article 207 TFEU.13 
The Ombudsman closed her inquiry with a critical remark concerning the Commission’s 
approach without drawing any further conclusions, particularly because the analysis of human 
rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives has now become a 
standard practice. In response to the 2012 Strategic Framework on Human Rights and 
Democracy (cf. supra), DG Trade has developed a set of relevant guidelines for this purpose. 
Moreover, the Commission’s Better Regulation package also includes a specific tool regarding 
fundamental rights and human rights.14 In this context, the impact of proposed trade-related 
policy initiatives is assessed against the normative framework of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and a number of international sources. Significantly, the Commission 
guidelines entail a broad definition of the scope and depth of the analysis, including “the 
potential impact of the proposed initiative on human rights in both the EU and the partner 
county/ies” with respect to “civil, political, economic, social, cultural and core labour rights”.15 
Moreover, in the case of negotiations of major trade and investment agreements, 
Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) are undertaken in parallel with the negotiations and 
allow the Commission to conduct an extended analysis of the potential human rights impacts. 
This involves an extensive consultation of stakeholders, including those in the partner 
country/ies.16 
Whereas this practice reveals the increased attention to the trade-human rights nexus in 
the post-Lisbon era, several questions remain concerning the precise implications of the HRIAs 
for the conduct of the CCP. For instance, the ombudsman firmly stated that “when negative 
impacts are identified, either the negotiated provisions need to be modified or mitigating 
measures have to be decided upon before the agreement is entered into.”17 The Commission, 
on the other hand, does not envisage such far-reaching implications. It rather sees the HRIAs 
as a tool to inform policy-makers about the potential impacts of the different options under 
consideration: 
 
An impact assessment should verify the existence of a problem, identify its underlying 
causes, assesses whether EU action is needed, and analyse the advantages and 
                                                     
13 Ibid., para. 11. 
14 See TOOL #28: https://ec.europa.eu/info/better-regulation-toolbox_en.  
15 Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives 
(n. 7), p. 5.  
16 Ibid, p. 6.  
17 European Ombudsman (n. 12), para. 25. 
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disadvantages of available solutions. It is not intended to pass a judgment on the actual 
human right situation in a country nor to decide whether a country is eligible for a trade 
agreement.18 
 
In other words, whereas the duty to conduct HRIAs in relation to trade-related policy 
initiatives may be regarded as a procedural obligation stemming from the combined reading 
of Article 207 TFEU and Articles 3 (5) TEU and 21 TEU, the substantive obligations are less 
evident. In particular, the question remains to what extent human rights considerations can 
be balanced with other interests. May certain negative impacts on human rights be 
compensated by gains in other areas, for instance the creation of job opportunities thanks to 
economic growth, or the introduction of cleaner technologies in a country allowing for 
progress in relation to sustainable development?19 Arguably, the principle that the EU 
institutions enjoy a wide margin of discretion in areas which involve political, economic and 
social choices and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments is relevant in 
this respect.20 This margin of discretion also applies in the field of external economic 
relations.21 It follows that judicial review is limited to the question whether the competent EU 
institutions made “manifest errors of assessment”.22 As argued by the General Court in the 
Frente Polisario case, this implies that the assessment is to be based on a careful and impartial 
analysis of all relevant facts of an individual case, with facts supporting the conclusion 
reached.23 
 
3. The Trade-Human Rights Nexus before the Court of Justice and the External Dimension 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights  
 
The EU’s duty to take into account fundamental rights when it acts in the area of its external 
policies, including the CCP, is confirmed in the case law of the EU Court of Justice (ECJ). In the 
Air Transport Association of America (ATAA) case, the Court derived from Article 3 (5) TEU an 
obligation for the EU “to observe international law in its entirety, including customary 
                                                     
18 Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives 
(n. 7), p. 2.  
19 O. De Schutter, ‘The implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU institutional framework’, 
Study for the AFCO Committee, 2016, p. 60.  
20 See e.g. Case C-72/15, Rosneft, para. 146; Case C-348/12 P, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement 
Kala Naft,EU:C:2013:776, para. 120. 
21 See e.g. Case T-572/93, Odigitria v Council and Commission, EU:T:1995:131, para. 38; Case T-512/12, Frente 
Polisario v. Council, EU:T:2015:953, para. 164. 
22 Case T-512/12, Frente Polisario v. Council, EU:T:2015:953, para. 224. 
23 Ibid., para. 225. 
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international law”.24 Whereas the precise scope of international customary law in relation to 
human rights is subject to discussion, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
the core human rights conventions used for the GSP+ system constitute an important source 
of reference.25 Of course, as also observed by the Court in ATAA, “since a principle of 
customary international law does not have the same precision as a provision of an 
international agreement, judicial review must necessarily be limited to the question whether, 
in adopting the act in question, the institutions of the European Union made manifest errors 
of assessment concerning the conditions for applying those principles.”26 
Hence, apart from the EU’s obligations with respect to the observance of (customary) 
international law, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) constitutes a crucial source of 
reference. As observed in the Commission’s guidelines on human rights impact assessments, 
respect for the CFR is “a binding legal requirement in relation to both internal and external 
policies.”27 In other words, the CFR has certain extraterritorial implications in the sense that 
it applies in relation to all EU activities irrespective of whether they take place within or 
outside its territorial boundaries. In this respect, it has been argued that the CFR differs from 
other human rights treaties, most notably the European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which usually contain a specific clause 
delimiting their application to acts with the State Parties’ jurisdiction.28 Article 51 (1) of the 
Charter defines its field of application in relation to its addressees, i.e. the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union and the Member States when they are implementing Union 
law, and in connection to the powers of the EU as conferred on it in the Treaties. It does not 
entail any reference to the territorial scope of application, implying that the obligations of the 
Charter apply whenever the EU acts. Hence, as observed by Moreno-Lax and Costello, “The 
key question is not whether the Charter applies territorially or extraterritorially, but whether 
a particular situation falls to be governed by EU law or not”.29 Or, to use the metaphor of Koen 
Lenaerts and Gutierrez-Fons, “the Charter is the ‘shadow’ of EU law. Just as an object defines 
the contours of its shadow, the scope of EU law determines that of the Charter”.30 
                                                     
24 Case C-366/10, ITAA, EU:C:2011:864, para. 101. 
25 V. Kube, ‘The European Union’s External Human Rights Commitment: What is the Legal Value of Article 21 
TEU?’, EUI Department of Law Research Paper, No. 2016/10, p. 20. 
26 Case C-366/10, ITAA, EU:C:2011:864, para. 110.  
27 Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives 
(n. 7), p. 5.  
28 See Art. 1 ECHR. 
29 V. Moreno-Lax and C. Costello, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From 
Territoriality to Facticity: the Effectiveness Model’, in S. Peers et. al. (eds.), Commentary on the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Hart, 2014), p. 1682. 
30 K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutierrez-Fons, ‘The place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice’, in S. Peers et. al. 
(eds.), Commentary on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart, 2014), p. 1568. 
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The view that the Charter applies in relation to the EU’s external policies seems supported 
by the case law of the ECJ. In Mugraby, a Lebanese applicant claimed that the Council and the 
Commission failed to suspend economic aid programmes under the human rights clause in the 
EU-Lebanon Association Agreement. Whereas the action failed, essentially in light of the 
institutions’ broad margin of discretion in the management of the EU’s external relations, it is 
noteworthy that neither the General Court nor the Court of Justice questioned the 
extraterritorial application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.31 A more explicit 
reference to the role of the Charter in relation to the EU’s external trade relations occurred in 
the Frente Polisario case. In this case, the Frente Polisario sought the annulment of the EU 
Council decision approving the agreement concerning the progressive liberalisation of trade 
in agricultural and fisheries products.32 In support of its action, the applicant set out not less 
than eleven pleas which all directly or indirectly touched upon the EU’s commitments to 
respect the right to self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara and the rights 
which derive from it. 
After recalling the settled case law concerning the EU institutions’ wide discretion in the 
field of external economic relations, the General Court pointed at the EU’s human rights 
obligations. Even though it found that there is “no absolute prohibition on concluding an 
agreement which may be applicable on disputed territory, the fact remains that the protection 
of fundamental rights of the population of such a territory is of particular importance and is, 
therefore, a question that the Council must examine before the approval of such an 
agreement”.33 In particular, the Council is bound “to examine, carefully and impartially, all the 
relevant facts in order to ensure that the production of goods for export is not conducted to 
the detriment of the population of the territory concerned, or entails infringements of 
fundamental rights”.34 Significantly, the Court referred to a wide range of Charter rights thus 
confirming the latter’s extraterritorial application. Whereas it agreed with the Council that the 
EU cannot be held responsible for actions committed by Morocco, this does not erase the EU 
from its obligation to prevent that it indirectly encourages a third country’s human rights 
violations or profits from them by allowing the export to its Member States of products which 
have been produced or obtained in conditions which do not respect the fundamental rights of 
the population of the territory from which they originate.35 For this purpose, the Council 
                                                     
31 L. Bartels, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effect’, European 
Journal of International Law (2014) 25 (4), p. 1076 and Kube (n. 25), p. 25. 
32 Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council, EU:T:2015:953. 
33 Ibid., para. 227. 
34 Ibid., para. 228. 
35 Ibid., para. 231. 
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should have examined that there was no risk and could not simply conclude that it was for the 
Kingdom of Morocco to ensure that the rights of the Sahrawi population are guaranteed.36 In 
other words, the General Court views the existence of a human rights impact assessment prior 
to the adoption of the Council decision as a crucial procedural requirement. 
In his opinion in the appeal procedure, Advocate General Wathelet agreed with the 
requirement of a human rights impact assessment but explicitly dismissed the General Court’s 
reliance on the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In his view, Article 51 of the 
Charter does not allow for an extraterritorial effect, unless an activity is “governed by EU law 
and carried out under the effective control of the EU and/or its Member States outside their 
territory”.37 This “effective control” doctrine is inspired by the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights but, as argued before, such parallelism is not very convincing taking into 
account that the Charter does not include a provision comparable to Article 1 ECHR. Hence, 
the Advocate General’s view that the scope of the human rights impact assessment should be 
confined to checking compliance with jus cogens and erga omnes norms as derived from the 
EU’s obligations under international law seems to deny the role of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in the EU legal order.38 
In its appeal judgment, the Court of Justice did not explicitly engage in the discussion 
regarding the extraterritorial application of the Charter. In contrast to the General Court, it 
concluded that the Association Agreement and the ensuing agreement on the liberalisation of 
trade in agricultural products did not apply to the Western Sahara, implying that the Polisario 
Front had no standing to seek the annulment of the decision at issue.39 Significantly, the Court 
of Justice based its reasoning on the principle of self-determination, which it defined as “a 
legally enforceable right erga omnes and one of the essential principles of international law.”40 
Proceeding from the application of the principle of the relative effect of treaties of Article 34 
of the VCLT, the people of the Western Sahara are defined as a “third party” implying that 
their consent is needed for the application of the agreement.41 Without entering into the 
background and the practical implications of this reasoning,42 it is sufficient to observe that 
“the ECJ left the door open for a fundamental rights assessment”.43 In any event, the Frente 
                                                     
36 Ibid., para. 241. 
37 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-104/16 P, Council v. Front Polisario, EU:C:2016:677, para. 270. 
38 For a similar view, see: V. Kube, ‘The Polisario Case: Do Fundamental Rights matter for EU trade policies?’, 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-polisario-case-do-eu-fundamental-rights-matter-for-eu-trade-polices/. 
39 Opinion of AG Wathelet in Case C-104/16 Council v. Front Polisario, EU:C:2016:677, para. 49. 
40 Case C-104/16 P Council v. Front Polisario, EU:C:2016:973, para. 88. 
41 Ibid., para. 106. 
42 See: G. Van der Loo, ‘The Dilemma of the EU’s Future Trade Relations with Western Sahara: Caught Between 
Strategic Interests and International Law?’, CEPS Commentary, 20 April 2018.  
43 Kube (n. 38).  
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Polisario case revealed the significance of fundamental rights considerations in relation to the 
CCP. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that in Opinion 1/17, both the Council and several Member States 
contested the applicability of the EU law principle of equal treatment (Articles 20 and 21 of 
the Charter) and the right of access to an independent tribunal (Article 47 of the Charter) in 
relation to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA).44 The 
Court of Justice used this opportunity to stress, once again, that “international agreements 
entered into by the Union must be entirely compatible with the Treaties and with the 
constitutional principles stemming therefrom.”45 Taking into account that the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights has the same legal value as the treaties, as expressed in Article 6 (1) TEU, 
it logically follows that the EU’s trade agreements must be fully compatible with the Charter. 
Of course, certain Charter provisions have a limited personal scope of application. This is, for 
instance, the case with Article 21 (2) of the Charter, which explicitly provides that the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited “within the scope 
of application of the Treaties”. As can be derived from the Explanations relating to the Charter, 
this corresponds to the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU and is, therefore, limited to 
situations involving EU Member State nationals. As a result, Article 21 (2) of the Charter is of 
no relevance in relation to the question of potential discrimination between nationals of the 
Member States and those of third countries.  
Significantly, the non-application of Article 21 (2) CFR does not affect the applicability of 
other provisions of the Charter which do not have a similar limitation and are, therefore, 
applicable to all situations governed by EU law, including those falling within the scope of 
international agreements entered into by the EU.46 This is, for instance, the case with 
Article 20 of the Charter, which provides that “everyone is equal before the law”. This implies 
that the Court may be called to examine whether an agreement which leads to a difference in 
treatment within the Union between third country nationals and Member State nationals is 
contrary to Article 20 CFR.47  
Fundamental rights concerns may not only relate to the material provisions of 
international agreements, but may also arise in relation to the established procedures for 
dispute settlement. For instance, in Opinion 1/17, Belgium raised a question concerning the 
compatibility of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism under the CETA with 
                                                     
44 Opinion 1/17 (CETA), EU:C:2019:341, para. 81 and 87.   
45 Ibid., para. 165 
46 Ibid., para. 171.  
47 Ibid., para. 172-175.  
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Canada with the fundamental right of access to an independent tribunal, as enshrined in 
Article 47 CFR. The Belgian government expressed its concern about the difficulties for small 
and medium-sized enterprises to obtain access to the CETA Tribunal given the high cost of 
such a dispute settlement procedure. In addition, uncertainties about the remuneration, 
appointment procedures, conditions for removal and the applicable rules of ethics for the 
Members of the CETA Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal all required an interpretation in light of 
Article 47 CFR. In this respect, the Court quickly rejected the argument put forward by the 
Council and the Member States that the Charter is inapplicable in relation to the envisaged 
ISDS mechanism. Whereas it is uncontested that the Charter is not binding for a non-Member 
State, in this case Canada, the Charter is binding for the Union. As a result, the Union cannot 
enter into an agreement that establishes judicial bodies that can issue binding awards and 
deal with disputes brought by EU litigants if the safeguards foreseen in the Charter are not 
guaranteed.48  
As a result, the Court assessed the compatibility of the CETA ISDS mechanism with the 
requirements of accessibility and independence as derived from Article 47 CFR. As far as the 
requirement of accessibility is concerned, the Court found that the financial cost could deter 
natural persons or small-sized enterprises from initiating proceedings before the CETA 
Tribunal and that the CETA did not contain legally binding commitments to address this 
problem.49 The agreement only provides that the CETA Joint Committee ‘may’ take decisions 
and ‘consider’ additional rules to reduce the financial burden for natural persons or small-
sized enterprises. However, the Court pointed at the crucial role of Statement No 36, which 
implies a commitment of the Commission and the Council to tackle the financial accessibility 
of the CETA Tribunal even if the CETA Joint Committee would not be able to adopt the 
necessary additional decisions.50 Without elaborating upon the legal nature of this statement, 
which was adopted on the occasion of the adoption by the Council of the decision authorising 
the signature of CETA,51 the Court simply concluded that this commitment “is sufficient 
justification, in the context of the present Opinion proceedings, for the conclusion that the 
CETA, as an ‘agreement envisaged’, within the meaning of Article 218(11) TFEU, is compatible 
with the requirement that those tribunals should be accessible.” 52 
                                                     
48 Ibid., para. 192.  
49 Ibid., para. 211-216. 
50 Ibid., para. 217-218. 
51 See: Council of the EU, Statements and Declarations entered into on the occasion of the adoption by the 
Council of the decision authorising the signature of CETA, doc. 13463/1/16, 27 October 2016.  
52 Opinion 1/17 (CETA), EU:C:2019:341, para. 219. 
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Whereas it may well be argued that the Statement does not involve any hard legal 
guarantee but only a political commitment on behalf of the EU institutions, the Court 
defended its approach by pointing at the close connection between the financial accessibility 
of the CETA dispute settlement mechanism and the conclusion of the CETA.53 In particular, 
the Member States can consider the progress regarding the review of the dispute settlement 
mechanism as part of their national ratification process. Taking into account that the Council 
only adopts the decision concluding the agreement after the ratification by all Member States, 
there is thus a strict political control on the implementation of the commitments laid down in 
Statement No 36. This line of reasoning allowed the Court to confirm the compatibility of the 
envisaged agreement with Article 47 Charter. Of course, in principle, there is still a possibility 
of ex post judicial review under the form of an action for annulment against the Council 
decision concluding the agreement, should there be any issues regarding the accessibility to 
the CETA Tribunal after the entry into force of the agreement. Taking into account the absence 
of explicit legal guarantees in the agreement and the essentially political control mechanism 
on the implementation of the commitment to reduce the financial burden of accessibility for 
natural persons and small-sized enterprises, such an option cannot be totally excluded when 
the envisaged initiatives of the CETA Joint Committee or the Commission and the Council 
would not lead to any concrete results.  
Finally, as far as the condition of independence of the CETA Tribunals is concerned, the 
Court applied its two-prong approach as defined in relation to the EU’s domestic legal order.54 
This involves an external dimension, which implies that a judicial body is to function 
autonomously without being subject to any external interventions or pressure, and an internal 
dimension, implying the maintenance of an equal distance from the parties to the proceedings 
and the absence of any personal interest of the judges in the outcome of the proceedings.55  
With respect to the external dimension, the Court recalled that the CETA Joint Committee, 
which plays a key role in the appointment, removal and remuneration of members of the CETA 
Tribunals, cannot affect the handling of disputes under the ISDS mechanism. Moreover, the 
EU’s consent to any decision of the CETA Joint Committee has to comply with EU primary law, 
including the right of an effective remedy enshrined in Art. 47 CFR.56 As far as the internal 
dimension is concerned, the Court concludes that the CETA provisions about the composition 
of the Tribunal as well as the references to the International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines 
                                                     
53 Ibid., para. 221.  
54 See e.g. Judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality, C-216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586.  
55 Opinion 1/17 (CETA), EU:C:2019:341, para. 202-203.  
56 Ibid., para. 237.  
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on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration are sufficient to satisfy the requirement of 
independence.57    
 
 
4. The Practice of Human Rights Clauses and Social Norms in EU Free Trade Agreements 
and the Challenge of Enforcement  
 
Apart from the evolving practice of human rights impact assessments and the external 
implications of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which may be directly attributed to the 
new legal and political framework of the Lisbon Treaty, the trade-human rights nexus is also 
visible through the inclusion of human rights clauses and social norms in EU Free Trade 
Agreements. Whereas this practice pre-dates the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,58 some 
significant developments can nevertheless be observed. 
First, in light of the Treaty objectives defined in Articles 3 (5) and 21 TEU, the inclusion of 
human rights clauses and social norms in FTAs is no longer a matter of foreign policy choice.59 
Rather, it is the expression of a constitutional obligation to ensure that the EU’s external 
action respects the “principles of democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of 
equality and solidarity and […] the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law.”60 
Second, in line with the well-established pre-Lisbon practice, international agreements 
concluded on behalf of the Union generally include an “essential element” clause in 
combination with a “non-execution” (suspension) clause as an expression of the parties’ 
commitment to respect core common values. The drafting of the respective clauses gradually 
developed over time and typically includes references to democratic principles, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.61 Whereas the EU only uses this form of 
human rights conditionality in very exceptional circumstances (such as a coup d’état), it is 
noteworthy that the post-Lisbon practice increasingly uses the essential element clause as a 
                                                     
57 Ibid., para. 238-244.  
58 On the pre-Lisbon practice, see e.g. E. Fierro, The EU’s Human Rights Approach to Human Rights Conditionality 
in Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) and L. Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International 
Agreements (OUP, 2015).  
59 L. Bartels, ‘Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements’, Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration (2013) 40 (4), p. 311. 
60 Art. 21 (1) TEU. 
61 N. Hachez, ‘Essential Element Clauses in EU Trade Agreements Making Trade Work in a Way That Helps Human 
Rights?’, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 158, April 2015.  
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normative framework for a positive and institutionalised dialogue on political reform in a 
partner country which underpins all instruments – including trade instruments – deployed by 
the EU.62 
Third, the EU’s post-Lisbon trade agreements all include a chapter on Trade and 
Sustainable Development (TSD) with references to labour and environmental standards that 
are based on multilateral instruments such as Conventions of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the United Nations Convention on Climate Change. Whereas such 
references were already included in pre-Lisbon trade agreements, the new generation of 
trade agreements are more explicit in their sustainable development objectives.63 Moreover, 
as observed in Opinion 2/15, TSD chapters now fall within the scope of the EU’s exclusive 
competence in relation to the CCP.64 In other words, making the liberalisation of trade 
relations with a third country subject to the condition of the parties’ compliance with 
international obligations concerning social protection of workers and environmental 
protection is a logical consequence of the post-Lisbon orientation of the CCP.  
Significantly, there is a certain overlap between the social norms included in the TSD 
chapter and the protection of human rights in the sense that core labour standards as defined 
within the framework of the ILO are also human rights which the parties are deemed to 
respect under the human rights clause.65 In this respect, it is noteworthy that the EU-Korea 
FTA, which has been used as a template for other FTAs, identifies four “fundamental rights” 
which the parties promise to respect: freedom of association and the effective recognition of 
the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; 
the effective abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation. Moreover, they commit themselves “to make continued and 
sustained efforts” towards ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions.66  
A recurring criticism concerns the weak enforcement mechanisms in relation to human 
rights clauses and social norms in EU free trade agreements67.68 The monitoring of 
implementation of the relevant commitments is essentially based on dialogue and 
cooperation without a possibility to use the normal dispute settlement procedures. The TSD 
                                                     
62 N. Ghazaryan, ‘A New Generation of Human Rights Clauses? The Case of Association Agreements in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood’, European Law Review (2015), p. 391-410.  
63 On the nexus between trade and sustainable development, see also chapter XXX in this Volume. 
64 Opinion 2/15 (Singapore FTA), EU:C:2017:376, para. 141-167.  
65 L. Bartels (n. 59), p. 312. 
66 Art. 13.4 (3) of the EU-Korea FTA (OJ 2011, L 127/62).  
67 On this issue, see also Chapter X in this Volume.  
68 C. Gammage, ‘A Critique of the Extraterritorial Obligations of the EU in Relation to Human Rights Clauses and 
Social Norms in EU Free Trade Agreements’, Europe in the World: A Law Review (2018) 2, p. 1.  
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chapters generally provide for the establishment of a specialised Committee with senior 
officials from the respective parties, accompanied by a civil society mechanism that may take 
the form of a Domestic Advisory Group. Disputes are to be resolved within a system of 
consultations with a possible referral to a Panel of Experts. This panel has the power to draw 
up a report and to make non-binding recommendations for the solution of the matter. It has 
been argued that this soft approach is one of the main weaknesses of the EU’s trade-human 
rights nexus.69 Without a more robust and formal dispute settlement mechanism, the 
effectiveness of including human rights clauses and social norms in EU free trade agreements 
remains questionable.  
A look at the available ex post impact assessments seems to confirm the rather weak 
enforcement of human and labour rights.70 The report on the EU-Mexico FTA found that “the 
commitments to human rights in the agreement still lack effective mechanisms through which 
human rights could be better monitored or defended”.71 The evaluation report of the 
implementation of the EU-Korea FTA bluntly concluded that “the EU-Korea FTA is assessed to 
have not changed the status quo of human and labour rights in Korea as they were when the 
FTA came into effect, in the sense that little change (positive or negative) over the 2011 
situation and/or longer term trends can be observed.”72 However, it would be too easy to 
reduce the soft approach to an exercise of mere window dressing without any concrete 
implications. A good example is the EU’s initiative to request, for the very first time, formal 
consultations with the Republic of Korea in relation to the country’s non-compliance with 
international labour standards as defined in the TSD chapter of the EU-Korea FTA.73 This 
initiative, which was launched in December 2018, reveals a more assertive approach on behalf 
of the EU and a clear willingness to use the available mechanisms under free trade agreements 
in order to ensure compliance with standards that go beyond the traditional scope of 
international trade relations.74 Significantly, this approach seemed to produce some effect in 
                                                     
69 Ibid. 
70 The ex-post evaluations are available at the website of the European Commission, DG Trade: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/analysis/policy-evaluation/ex-post-evaluations/. 
71 Ex-post Evaluation of the Implementation of the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, February 2017: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/156011.htm, p. 161.  
72 Evaluation of the Implementation of the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and its Member States and 
the Republic of Korea, May 2018, p. 244 available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/157716.htm.  
73 Request for consultations by the European Union: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tradoc_157586.pdf.  
74 In this respect, it is noteworthy that adopting a more assertive approach towards the enforcement of 
commitments made under the TSD chapters was one of the recommendations included in a non-paper of the 
Commission services in February 2018, entitled ‘Feedback and way forward on improving the implementation 
and enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements’.                                       
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the sense that the Korean government announced the objective to ratify three key ILO 




The constitutionalisation of the trade-human rights nexus with the Treaty of Lisbon influences 
the law and practice of the CCP in several aspects. Most notably, it resulted in the adoption of 
new policy frameworks and strategies ensuring the mainstreaming of human rights 
considerations in all EU external policies, including the CCP. Of particular significance is the 
inclusion of human rights impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives. As observed 
by Advocated General Wathelet in the Frente Polisario case, “the Council and the Commission 
have set the bar very high for themselves”.76 The discussion surrounding the absence of a prior 
impact assessment for the conclusion of the FTA with Vietnam and the critical remarks of the 
European ombudsman in this respect, as well as the Frente Polisario case reveal the political 
and legal significance of human rights impact assessments in relation to the conclusion of 
international trade agreements. 
 Whereas there is a general consensus that the EU must take into account fundamental 
rights in its external action, the precise implementation and operationalisation of these duties 
remains subject to discussion.77 The increased attention to human rights as a “founding value” 
(Article 2 and 3 (5) TEU), “guiding principle” (Article 21 (1) TEU) and “objective” 
(Article  21 (2) (b) TEU) implies at least a duty to put human rights on the agenda of trade 
negotiations. Arguably, it involves certain procedural obligations such as conducting human 
rights impact assessments prior to concluding trade agreements, ensuring that adequate 
monitoring mechanisms are in place and establishing accountability mechanisms.78 The 
effectiveness of EU human rights conditionality in external trade instruments is yet another 
discussion which largely depends upon a variety of factors such as the integration of trade 
instruments in a broader human rights agenda, the position of third countries and the interests 
of the various actors and institutions.79 Bibliography 
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